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JOHN F. MURPHY*
This year's report on foreign claims takes a different approach to the subject than that
followed last year.' The subjects covered in last year's report included the Helms-Burton Act,
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the International Law Commission
and State Responsibility, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, Claims against Iraq, and one miscellane-
ous topic. The Helms-Burton Act, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, and Claims against Iraq are
covered in other contributions to International Legal Developments in Review: 1997. Since the
International Law Commission is still gathering submissions of United Nations (UN) member
states' views on the sixty draft articles it adopted in the summer of 1996, it limited its work
on State Responsibility at its 1997 summer session to the appointment of a new special rapporteur
and to deciding to complete its work by the end of the Commission's present term of office
(i.e., by the year 2001).3 Because no miscellaneous topics are worthy of note this year, the
report is limited to a discussion of some significant developments under amendments to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) effected by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act and subsequent legislation.
The report is organized in the following fashion. First, it examines the backdrop to the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, including efforts prior to the passage of the
Act to hold foreign states civilly liable in U.S. courts for acts of terrorism. Second, it examines
three decisions recently rendered under the FSIA, two of which upheld the constitutionality
of the 1996 amendments to the FSIA. Third, it considers the amendments and the cases
rendered under them in the context of the wider issue of holding states accountable for the
commission of international crimes. Finally, it reaches some tentative conclusions.
*John F. Murphy is Professor of Law at Villanova University. He is the chair of the Foreign Claims Committee
and editor of International Legal Developmrnts in Review: 1997.
1. For last year's contribution, see John F. Murphy, Foreign Claims, 31 INT'L LAw. 579 (1997).
2. For discussion of the Helms-Burton Act, see Wynn H. Segall, Running on Empty: US. Economic Sanctions
and Export Controls in 1997 in this issue. For brief consideration of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and Claims
Against Iraq, see Roger Alford and Peter H. F. Bekker, International Courts and Tribunals in this issue.
3. For discussion, see Robert Rosenstock, The Forty-Nintb Session of the International Law Commission, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 107, 111-12 (1998).
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I. Brief Backdrop to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
This report is not the forum to examine in detail the history of foreign sovereign immunity.
4
It is worth noting in passing, however, that until relatively recently foreign sovereigns enjoyed
absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts. Only during the twentieth century,
as governments increasingly engaged in state trading and other commercial ventures, did the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity emerge. This restrictive theory denied immunity in
cases arising out of commercial transactions on the ground that absolute immunity was unfair
because it deprived private parties of their judicial remedies when dealing with states, and gave
the latter an unfair competitive advantage over private commercial enterprises. This rationale,
then, distinguished between private, commercial acts for which foreign states enjoyed no immu-
nity and public acts for which they continued to enjoy immunity.
The terms of the FSIA as it was adopted in 1976 reflected a restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity! Aside from the commercial activity exception, however, the exceptions to sovereign
immunity under the FSIA were few. Indeed, prior to 1996, absent an explicit or implicit waiver
of immunity, the liability of a foreign sovereign for noncommercial, public acts was largely
limited to noncommercial torts that were committed and had their injurious consequences in
the United States.6 With rare exceptions, foreign sovereigns enjoyed complete immunity under
the FSIA from possible civil liability for terrorist acts. The immunity was complete for terrorist
acts committed against U.S. nationals overseas.7
Some creative efforts were used to bring suits in U.S. courts against foreign sovereigns for
violations of the law of nations committed outside the territorial boundaries of the United
States. One such action enjoyed momentary success. In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Sbipping Company,8 an oil tanker, owned by one Liberian corporation and chartered by another
Liberian corporation to transport oil from Alaska to the Virgin Islands by sailing around the
southern tip of South America, was allegedly bombed without provocation or warning by an
Argentinian military aircraft. Argentina was engaged in a war with Great Britain over the
Falkland Islands at the time. The owner and charterer of the tanker filed suit in federal district
court under the Alien Tort Statute, which provides that "district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States."' The district court granted Argentina's motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings, on the ground
4. For a brief but excellent discussion of this background, see G.B. Born and D. Westin, INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 450 (2d ed. 1992).
5. For the text of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, see 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (West Supp.
1998).
6. For the noncommercial tort exception, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(5) (West Supp. 1998). For cases where
terrorist activity occurred in the United States and therefore fell within the noncommercial tort exception, see
Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980) and Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419
(9th Cir. 1989).
7. One arguable exception to this statement is Siderman v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993), where the court found that alleged torture by Argentine officials of three
Argentine and one U.S. citizen fell within the commercial activity exception of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(2). It is
questionable, however, whether Siderman is still valid after the Supreme Court's decision in Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993), where a majority of the Supreme Court held that Saudi Arabia's alleged torture
of Mr. Nelson did not constitute a commercial activity within the meaning of the FSIA.
8. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
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that the FSIA was not intended to eliminate the preexisting remedies of the Alien Tort Statute.
The Supreme Court, however, unanimously reversed, holding that the FSIA provides the sole
basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of the United States and that
none of the exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity enumerated in the FSIA applied to this
case.
In Smith v. Socialist People'Libyan Arabjamabiiya,"' the plaintiffs were the personal represen-
tatives of the victims of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988
and their estates. In response to defendants' motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs advanced a number
of arguments to support their contention that defendants did not enjoy immunity under the
FSIA. According to the plaintiffs, Libya, by participating in the bombing of Pan Am Flight
103, had violated a peremptory or jus cogens norm of international law and thereby waived
its immunity under the FSIA. Although it found this argument "appealing," the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that there was no evidence in the legislative
history of the FSIA that Congress contemplated an implied waiver of that sort by its use of
the phrase "waiver ... by implication." The court noted that two other circuits had considered
whether a violation of a jus cogens standard constitutes an implied waiver within the meaning
of the FSIA, and both had rejected the claim."
The plaintiffs also argued that Pan Am Flight 103 should have been considered the "territory"
of the United States for purposes of the FSIA. The court rejected this argument on the ground
that merely because a location is subject to an assertion of U.S. authority it does not necessarily
follow that it is the "territory" of the United States for purposes of the FSIA. Accordingly,
the court held, the bombing did not fall within the noncommercial tort exception to immunity
under the FSIA.
Lastly, the plaintiffs made an argument based on the language in the FSIA that a foreign
state's immunity is "[slubject to existing international agreements to which the United States
is a party at the time of enactment of [the FSIA]."2 According to the plaintiffs, Security
Council Resolution 748,3 which commits Libya to pay compensation to the victims of Pan
Am Flight 103, is a binding treaty obligation under article 25 of the UN Charter and is therefore
covered by the above quoted language of the FSIA. The court disagreed. In its view, this FSIA
displacement of immunity is applicable only to international agreements in effect at the time
the FSIA was adopted and cannot be interpreted to provide a "dynamic expansion whereby
FSIA immunity can be removed by action of the UN taken after the FSIA was enacted."'
4
The frustrations of the plaintiffs in the Smith case, as well as those of similarly situated
plaintiffs in other cases, provided the political momentum that led to the revisions to the FSIA
contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. These revisions amend
the FSIA to permit a suit for money damages against a foreign state for personal injury or
death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking,
or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if the act or provision of
support is engaged in by an official agent of the foreign state while acting within the scope of
10. 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996).
11. Id. at 245. The two cases the court referred to are Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir.
199"4) and Siderman v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 714-19 (9th Cir. 1992).
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
13. UN Security Council Resolution Deciding that Libya Must Comply with Previous Request and Imposing
Certain Sanctions, Letters Regarding Venezuelan Diplomat Mission in Libya and Sec.-General Report, March
31, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 749, 750 [hereinafter Security Council Resolution 748].
14. Smitb v. Socialist People's Libya Arab Jamabiriya, 101 F.3d at 247.
SUMMER 1998
456 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
his or her duties."5 The court shall decline to hear such a claim if: (1) the foreign state was
not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration
Act of 197916 or Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 196l17 at the time the act
occurred, unless later so designated as a result of such acts; (2) the act occurred within the
designated foreign state against which the claim was brought and the claimant did not afford
the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim; or (3) the claimant or victim
was not a U.S. national. At this writing, the states designated as sponsors of terrorism indude
Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act also amended the FSIA in another
significant respect. In addition to lifting immunity from suit for state sponsors of terrorism,
the Act also revises the FSIA to permit the attachment of, or execution upon a judgment
against, the property of a foreign state, used for a commercial activity in the United States.
This action is taken when the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not
immune as a state sponsor of terrorism, regardless of whether the property is or was involved
with the act upon which the claim is based.'8 Normally, the property of a foreign state is
immune from attachment or execution if the property was not involved with the act upon
which the claim is based.' 9
Under separate legislation,2" the FSIA was subsequently amended to grant a cause of action
against an official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state sponsor of terrorism
who commits any of the acts covered by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's
amendments to the FSIA, if the official, employee, or agent acts within the scope of his or
her office, employment, or agency. This is significant, because the FSIA as otherwise enacted
is not intended to affect the substantive law of liability in actions against foreign states."'
II. Court Decisions under FSIA as Amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act and Subsequent Legislation
A. ALEJANDRE V. CUBA2 2
The first decision rendered under the amended FSIA arose out of the same facts that induced
President Clinton to sign the Helms-Burton Act, namely, the shooting down of two unarmed
civilian planes over international waters by the Cuban Air Force. Four persons died as a result
of this incident, and the personal representatives of three of them filed suit to recover monetary
damages against Cuba and the Cuban Air Force in the U.S. Southern District Court of Florida.
One of the victims was not a U.S. citizen and his family therefore could not join the suit.
Neither Cuba nor the Cuban Air Force defended the suit, asserting through a diplomatic note
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1994).
16. 50 U.S.C. § 2405(j) (1994).
17. 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (1994).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(aX7) (1994).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1994).
20. Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, enacted on September 30, 1996 as part of the
1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. A, Title I § 101(c) [Title V, § 589],
110 Stat. 3009-3172 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 (West Supp. 1998)).
21. See e.g., Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1425 (9th Cir. 1989).
22. No. 96-10127-CIV-KING, 96-10128-CIV-KING, 1997 WL 847062, at *I (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 1997).
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that the court had no jurisdiction over Cuba or its political subdivisions. The court nonetheless
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.23
The court found that the Cuban Air Force never notified or warned the civilian planes,
never attempted other methods of interception, and never gave them the opportunity to land.
In the court's view, these omissions clearly violated international norms requiring the exhaustion
of all measures before resorting to force against any aircraft and banning the use of force against
civilian aircraft altogether.
The court further found that plaintiffs had met all requirements under FSIA as amended
to establish an exception to foreign sovereign immunity. The unprovoked firing of deadly
rockets came within the statute's definition of "extrajudicial killing." The Cuban Air Force
was acting as an agent of Cuba when it committed the killings and Cuba had been designated
as a state sponsor of terrorism. The act occurred outside of Cuban territory and the plaintiffs
were all U.S. citizens at the time of the shoot down. The court also held that the plaintiffs
could base their substantive cause of action on the FSIA, because, as amended, the FSIA creates
a cause of action against agents of a foreign state that act under the conditions that result in
a loss of foreign sovereign immunity.2 4 Morever, since the plaintiffs had proved the Cuban
Air Force's liability under the FSIA, Cuba itself was liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
The court turned next to the issue of damages. It noted that the FSIA as amended provides
that an agent of a foreign state who commits an extrajudicial killing shall be liable for "money
damages which may include economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive
damages," 2 and accordingly held that the Cuban Air Force was liable for both compensatory
and punitive damages. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the court stated, Cuba was
liable for the same amount of damages as its agent, with the exception of punitive damages,
which the FSIA expressly prohibits against foreign states.26 The court found that the plaintiffs
should be awarded compensatory damages of over $49 million against Cuba and the Cuban
Air Force and punitive damages of over $ 137 million against the Cuban Air Force.
B. FLATOW V. IRAN
Strictly speaking, the second decision under the recent amendments to the FSIA was handed
down on March 11, 1998, rather than in 1997. Most of the proceedings before the court,
however, took place in 1997 and were a natural consequence of the adoption of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act in 1996.
In Flatow the plaintiff alleged that his daughter, Alisa Michelle Flatow, was the victim of a
terrorist suicide bombing of a bus on which she was a passenger. On April 9, 1995, a suicide
bomber drove a van loaded with explosives into an Israeli bus while it was traveling in the
Gaza Strip. The resulting explosion destroyed the bus and caused a piece of shrapnel to pierce
Alisa's skull. Suffering from a severe head injury, she died in an Israeli hospital. The Shaqaqi
23. In the case of a lawsuit against a foreign state, the FSIA does not permit the entry of a default judgment.
Rather, the plaintiffs must establish their "claim or right to relief by evidence that is satisfactory to the court."
28 U.S.C.A. § 1608(e) (West Supp. 1998).
24. See Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, supra note 20.
25. Id.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 provides, in pertinent part: "[t]he foreign state shall be liable in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances; but a foreign state except for an agency
or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages."
27. No. 97-396 (RCL), 1998 WL 111500 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 1998).
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faction of Palestine Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the bombing, and investigations by
Israeli authorities and by U.S. Department of State officials confirmed this claim. The Depart-
ment of State also reported that Iran had provided approximately $2 million to Palestine Islamic
Jihad annually in support of its terrorist activities.
As in the Alejandre case, defendants did not enter an appearance. The court nonetheless
proceeded to render judgment against them. The court found that the death of the plaintiffs
daughter was caused by a willful and deliberate act of extrajudicial killing and that the suicide
bomber had acted under the direction of the defendants including Iran, the Iranian Ministry
of Information and Security, and several Iranian officials acting within the scope of their offices.
Finding that plaintiff had successfully proved facts necessary for a finding of no immunity under
the FSIA and a cause of action under the Act, the court held that defendants were liable. The
most noteworthy aspects of the court's holding, however, were its discussion of constitutional
issues and its calculation of damages.
While noting that Congress had expressly directed the retroactive application of the amend-
ments to the FSIA, the court rejected the defendants' contention that such retroactive application
was unconstitutional. In the court's view,
the state sponsored terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity is a remedial statute. It
creates no new responsibilities or obligations; it only creates a forum for the enforcement of
pre-existing universally recognized rights under federal common law and international law ... As
international terrorism is subject to universal jurisdiction, defendants had adequate notice that
their actions were wrong and susceptible to adjudication in the United States."
The court next addressed the question of whether there was a constitutional basis for exercising
personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The court first suggested that dicta in Supreme Court
decisions"9 indicated that a foreign state might not be a "person" for purposes of constitutional
due process analysis. Even if it is, the court concluded, "a foreign state that sponsors terrorist
activities which causes(sic) the death or personal injury of a United States national will invariably
have sufficient contacts with the United States to satisfy Due Process." 30 The court supported
this conclusion by noting that the suit was brought against Iran and its officials for actions in
their sovereign capacity and by suggesting that sovereign contacts should therefore be sufficient
to sustain general jurisdiction over defendants. Moreover, applying the "fair play and substantial
justice" standard of International Sboe,3" the court held that since terrorism has been almost
universally condemned, fair play and substantial justice are well served by the exercise of
jurisdiction over state sponsors of terrorism.
Turning to the question of damages, the court determined that, in addition to compensatory
damages, plaintiff could recover punitive damages, not only against officials, employees, or
agents of Iran but against Iran itself. Although, as noted by the court in Alexandre," the FSIA,
by its terms, limits the imposition of punitive damages to officials, employees, or agents of a
foreign state, and appears expressly to rule out punitive damages against a foreign state, the
court in Flatow held that punitive damages awarded against a foreign state's officials, agents,
or employees for the provision of material support and resources to a terrorist group whose
28, Id. at *10.
29. Id. at * 16. The Supreme Court decisions referred to by the court were Verlinden v. Central Bank of
Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 484 n.5 (1982) and Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1992).
30. Id. at *19 (emphasis supplied).
31. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
32. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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acts result in personal injury or wrongful death of a U.S. national can be imputed to the foreign
state under the doctrines of respondeat superior and vicarious liability. Stressing the deterrent
effect of punitive damages, the court determined, with the assistance of expert testimony, that
an award of punitive damages in the amount of three times Iran's annual expenditure for
terrorist activities, or $225 million, would be appropriate. The total damages awarded to the
plaintiff came to $247.5 million.
C. REIN V. SOCIALIsT PEOPLE'S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA"
As pointed out by the court, the plaintiffs in Rein were seeking the same relief that had
been denied in Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamabiriya, discussed above. The plaintiffs
in Rein were, of course, relying on the 1996 amendments to the FSIA. Libya's defense this
time was to mount a constitutional challenge to the 1996 amendments. Unlike Cuba and Iran,
Libya has from the outset vigorously defended itself in U.S. court proceedings.
Libya first argued that the 1996 amendments to the FSIA are unconstitutional because they
provide that federal court jurisdiction is to be determined by the Secretary of State. The court
ruled that the amendments merely confirmed the power or subject matter jurisdiction of U.S.
courts to hear controversies between citizens of the United States and foreign states and directed
the courts to dedine to hear daims against states not designated as terrorist states. As to claims
against states so designated, the amendments left open the discretion of the courts to hear such
claims. Moreover, the court stated, Congress clearly had the power to delegate to the executive
branch the responsibility of determining those foreign nations that may be accorded sovereign
immunity by the courts.
Libya next contended that the court had no personal jurisdiction over it. The court felt that
the relevant inquiry was whether the effects of a foreign state's actions upon the United States
are sufficient to give that state fair warning that it may be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts. In the court's view, any foreign state would "know that the United states has substantial
interests in protecting its flag carriers and its nationals from terrorist activities and should
reasonably expect that if these interests were harmed, it would be subject to a variety of potential
responses, including civil actions in U.S. courts."'
Libya then claimed that the provisions providing for the designation of states as sponsors
of terrorism violated their due process rights to a fair trial. The court noted, however, that
the Secretary of State's designation went only to establishing jurisdiction in particular cases
and had no effect on the plaintiffs' burden to prove the merits of their case. Because the
Secretary's designation implicated no fundamental right, the court said, Libya's contention that
a strict scrutiny test should be applied to the amendments was incorrect. Rather, the proper
test was the rational basis approach, and, the court held, the 1996 amendments were "a
reasonable means of achieving the legitimate government purpose of protecting Untied States
nationals and air carriers in international travel to and from the United States." 5
Lastly, the court found that Libya's daim that the 1996 amendments were an impermissible
ex post facto law had no merit. According to the court, the ex post facto doctrine was inapplicable
to the question of whether a foreign state is immune from liability in civil tort actions. A
foreign state is not criminally punished merely because the United States decides not to grant
sovereign immunity to it in a civil action in a U.S. court.
33. No. 96-CV-2077 (TCP), 1998 WL 84609, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1998).
34. Id. at *4.
35. Id. at *5.
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In conclusion the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted.
III. The Amendments to the FSIA and Holding States Accountable for
International Crimes
A full discussion of the significance of the 1996 amendments to the FSIA for efforts to hold
states accountable for international crimes would require book-length treatment. For present
purposes, a few brief comments will have to suffice. First, it is important to note that the
plaintiffs' victories in the Alejandre and Flatow cases, while of considerable symbolic significance,
may also serve to demonstrate the unsatisfactory nature of current law and practice if the
plaintiffs are ultimately unable to collect on their judgments. The plaintiffs in the Alejandre
case are currently unable to execute against any of Cuba's assets in the United States, since
the same are presently "frozen" under executive orders and await final resolution of a variety
of U.S. claims against Cuba. Although Iran's assets in the United States do not suffer from
the same disability, it is unclear at this writing whether Iran has assets in this country that are
used for a commercial activity, and if so, the extent of such assets. If there are no assets or
insufficient assets to execute judgment upon in the United States, it will be exceedingly difficult,
if not impossible, to execute the judgment against Iranian assets in other countries."
For their part, the plaintiffs in the Rein case now have to prove their case against Libya,
and this may be difficult to do. Plaintiffs will have to prove that officials, employees, or agents
of Libya caused the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 while acting within the scope of their
office, employment, or agency. This burden of proof may be especially onerous because of a
limitation on discovery in civil cases brought under the antiterrorism exception created by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act." Under this provision, if the Attorney General
determines that discovery in a case brought under the antiterrorism amendments would "signifi-
cantly interfere with a criminal investigation or prosecution, or a national security operation
related to the incident," 38 he or she may so advise the court, and the court shall stay such
discovery for twelve months subject to renewal for additional twelve month periods. Even if
they succeed in proving their case and obtaining a judgment, the plaintiffs in Rein will face
grave difficulties in recovering their judgment because Libyan assets in the United States are
frozen and because of the difficulties they would encounter in enforcing their judgment abroad.
These efforts to hold states responsible for the commission of international crimes in U.S.
courts should be considered in the context of recent efforts to hold them accountable through
international institutions. Two examples are particularly noteworthy.
First, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is currently considering a claim by Bosnia-
Herzegovina that Yugoslavia committed genocide during the war in Bosnia, in violation of its
obligations as a party to the Genocide Convention39 and customary international law. Also
being considered is a counterclaim by Yugoslavia that Bosnia-Herzegovina itself committed
36. For discussion of some of these difficulties, see, e.g., ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND UNITED STATES JUDGMENTS ABROAD (Ronald A. Brand, ed. 1992).
37. 28 U.S.C.A, § 160S(g)(I)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1998).
38. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(g)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1998).
39. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 13, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S.
277.
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genocide that the ICJ has just ruled is admissible.4 This case represents the first meaningful
action taken under the Genocide Convention during the fifty years since its adoption by the
UN General Assembly in 1948.
Second, the United States and Great Britain have undertaken efforts against Libya in the
UN Security Council for its support of international terrorism and the counteraction that Libya
has taken before the ICJ. The U.S. and British initiatives in the Security Council came about
because of Libya's refusal to surrender two Libyan members of the Libyan secret service who
were indicted by a Grand Jury of the District of Columbia in November 1991. In response
the Security Council adopted several resolutions that, inter alia, demanded that Libya surrender
the two accused, as well as cease its support for all terrorist activity. In addition, it imposed
economic sanctions against Libya.4'
For its part Libya claimed that, under the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 2 the only obligation on Libya was to
decide, in its absolute discretion, whether it would extradite the accused persons or submit
them to its own courts for purposes of prosecution. Since Libya has allegedly submitted the
two accused persons to its competent authorities to be prosecuted under Libyan law, it claims
it has fulfilled its obligations under the Montreal Convention and that the United States and
Great Britain, in insisting that Libya surrender the accused, are violating the Convention. On
March 3, 1992, Libya brought an action against the United States and the United Kingdom
before the ICJ and requested that the Court "indicate provisional measures" (roughly issue an
injunction) against the United States and Great Britain in an effort to prevent them from
imposing the sanctions against it. The court declined to do so.4 More recently, however, on
February 27, 1998, the ICJ ruled by a thirteen to two vote that it has jurisdiction to consider
the merits of Libya's claims against the United States and Great Britain."
It remains to be seen what the outcomes of these proceedings in the Security Council and
the ICJ will be. Potentially, they could constitute major advances in the struggle to hold states
accountable for the commission of international crimes-at least if (1) the ICJ finds that one
or more of the states parties to the Bosnian war and the Genocide Convention committed
genocide and rules against Libya on the merits of its claims, and (2) the Security Council
continues its economic sanctions against Libya. In any event, holding sovereign states civilly
liable for the commission of terrorism and other international crimes is a major development.
The basic question now is what additional steps, if any, might be taken to strengthen the use
of civil suits as a method for holding state sponsors accountable for the commission of interna-
tional crimes. What follows are a few tentative proposals that might be considered at greater
length in other forums.
40. The Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) was decided by the ICJ on December 17, 1997. The full text of the decision
can be found through the ICJ web site, < http://www.icj-cij.org>. For a summary of this decision, see Peter H.
F. Bekker, Recent Developments at the World Court, ASIL NEwsi-rrER, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 1.
41. UN Security Council Resolution Urging Libya to Respond to Requests for Cooperation in Investigation
of Aerial Incident, Jan. 21, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 731; Security Council Resolution 748, supra note 13.
42. Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24
U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
43. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From The Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K., Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 3, 114 (Orders of Apr. 14).
44. For a summary of this decision, see Peter H. F. Bekker, The ICI Upbolds Its Jurisdiction in Lockerbie Cases,
ASIL NEWSLEMrr, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 2. The full text of the decision may be found on the ICJ web site at
<http://www.icj-cij.org>.
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One possibility would be for the United States and other like-minded states to propose an
international convention. This convention would require states parties to adopt national legisla-
tion that would permit suits against sovereign states by the victims or their representatives
for the commission of certain international crimes, such as, the crimes covered by the 1996
amendments to the FSIA. Sovereign immunity should no longer be a shield for state sponsors
of such egregious international crimes to hide behind. Since these crimes are already subject
to universal jurisdiction when committed by individuals, it may be time to consider the applica-
tion of the principle of universal jurisdiction to state sponsors of such crimes.
Such a convention might also contain provisions requiring state parties to enforce money
judgments rendered by the courts of other state parties-subject to certain exceptions in the
event of judgments rendered under circumstances that offended strong public policy of the
state requested to enforce the judgment. These provisions might be coupled with a requirement
that the state party enforcing the judgment allow execution of the judgment against the civilly
liable state's assets located in its territory.
Finally, the convention might contain a compromissory clause that permits reference to the
ICJ of disputes between states parties over the interpretation or application of the convention.
This could serve as a safeguard against a state party permitting a suit to be brought and a
judgment to be rendered against a state that was not grounded in fact or law, but was instead
designed simply to punish the state defendant as an adversary of the state party permitting the
suit. It would also be necessary for the convention to contain provisions ensuring that states
would be subject to civil liability for international crimes only after a court proceeding that
was conducted in accordance with principles of due process.
More modest proposals might also be considered. Thought might be given, for example, to
amending the FSIA to permit the execution of judgments obtained under the Act's antiterrorism
provisions against any property of the state sponsor located in the United States, whether used
for commercial or public purposes. Just as a foreign sovereign can be held civilly liable under
the FSIA for noncommercial public acts if they constitute the specified crimes, so too, arguably,
should the property of the foreign sovereign be subject to execution of a judgment based on
such crimes, even if the property is used for the public functions of the sovereign.
Assuming that conclusion of a multilateral convention along the lines described above would
not be possible, an alternative approach might be to attempt to conclude bilateral agreements
along such lines, especially with states that serve as major financial centers such as Great Britain
and Germany. Such bilateral agreements might be especially useful in improving the chances
that successful plaintiffs would be able to find assets of defendant foreign sovereigns that they
would be able to execute judgments against.
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the proposals advanced above are highly tentative
and preliminary in nature. Moreover, they raise complex political issues, a discussion of which
is beyond the scope of this brief essay.4"
45. The major political issue is the one raised by executive branch officials during hearings on the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act: whether holding foreign sovereigns civilly liable for international crimes will
result in retaliatory suits filed against the U.S. government in foreign courts or undermine important U.S. foreign
policy interests. For testimony expressing this concern, see, e.g., Foreign Terrorism and U.S. Courts: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103 d Cong. 14 (1994) (statement
of Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Adviser to the U.S. Dept. of State).
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